Americans for Safe Access, et al v. DEA, US DC Cir. (1/22/13)
Constitutional Law, Drugs & Biotech, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
The DEA, under the authority of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. 812(b)(1)(B), classified marijuana as a Schedule I drug, the most restricted drug classification under the Act. Petitioners challenged the DEA’s denial of its petition to initiate proceedings to reschedule marijuana as a Schedule III, IV, or V drug. The principal issue on appeal was whether the DEA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. First, the court denied the Government’s jurisdictional challenge because the court found that at least one of the named petitioners had standing to challenge the agency’s action. On the merits, the court held that the DEA’s denial of the rescheduling petition survived review under the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard where the petition asked the DEA to reclassify marijuana, which, under the terms of the Act, required a “currently accepted medical use.” A “currently accepted medical use” required, inter alia, “adequate and well-controlled studies proving efficacy.” The court deferred to the agency’s interpretation of these regulations and found that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that such studies did not exist. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.
Read More: D.C. Circuit snuffs challenge over marijuana classification
Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., US 1st Cir. (1/17/13)
ERISA, Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law
Plaintiff was a partner in a medical practice where she served as a staff anesthesiologist. When Plaintiff’s dependence on opioids came to light, her employer had in force a group employee benefit plan, underwritten and administered by Union Security Insurance Company & Management Company for Merrimack Anesthesia Associates Long Term Disability Plan (USIC), which included long-term disability (LTD) benefits. When Plaintiff applied for those benefits, USIC refused to pay benefits past the point when Plaintiff was discharged from a treatment center, finding that Plaintiff’s risk for relapse was not the same as a current disability. Plaintiff brought suit in the federal district court. The district court ultimately awarded Plaintiff LTD benefits for the maximum time available under the plan, concluding that categorically excluding the risk of drug abuse relapse was an unreasonable interpretation of the plan. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, in an addiction context, a risk of relapse can be so significant as to constitute a current disability.
Lozman’s floating home was a plywood structure with empty bilge space underneath to keep it afloat. He had it towed several times before deciding on a marina owned by the city of Riviera Beach. After various disputes and unsuccessful efforts to evict him from the marina, the city brought an admiralty lawsuit in rem against the home, seeking a lien for dockage fees and damages for trespass. The district court found the floating home to be a “vessel” under the Rules of Construction Act, which defines a “vessel” as including “every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water,” 1 U. S. C. 3; concluded that admiralty jurisdiction was proper; and awarded fees and damages. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the home was “capable” of movement over water despite subjective intent to remain moored indefinitely. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the case was not moot, although the home has been destroyed. Lozman’s floating home is not a “vessel.” The definition of “transportation” must be applied in a practical way; a structure does not fall within its scope unless a reasonable observer, looking to the home’s physical characteristics and activities, would consider it designed to a practical degree for carrying people or things over water. But for the fact that it floats, nothing about Lozman’s home suggests that it was designed to any practical degree to transport persons or things over water. It had no steering mechanism, had an unraked hull and rectangular bottom 10 inches below water, and had no capacity to generate or store electricity. It lacked self-propulsion, unlike an ordinary houseboat. The Court considered only objective evidence to craft a “workable and consistent” definition that “should offer guidance in a significant number of borderline cases.”
Plaintiff, a freelance photographer, took a photograph of a man, who called himself Clark Rockefeller, and the man’s daughter. Later, it was discovered that the man had abducted his daughter and that his real name was Christian Gerhartsreiter. The photo was used by the FBI in a “Wanted” poster and was distributed in the media. Appellee Sony Pictures Television, Inc. subsequently produced a movie based on Gerhartsreiter’s identity deception. In the movie, Sony pictured the photo using an image similar and pose and composition to Plaintiff’s original. The photo, however, was different in a number of respects. Plaintiff filed this infringement action, alleging a copyright violation. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellees, concluding that no reasonable jury could find substantial similarity between Sony’s recreated photo and Plaintiff’s original. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that no jury could properly conclude that Sony’s adaption of the photo infringed Plaintiff’s copyright in his work.
The Ernest Hemingway Home and Museum appealed the district court’s post-trial order denying it declaratory and injunctive relief. The Museum challenged the jurisdiction of the USDA to regulate the Museum as an animal exhibitor under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA), 7 U.S.C. 2131 et seq. The court concluded that the Museum’s exhibition of the Hemingway cats (descendants of Hemingway’s polydactyl cat, Dexter), which roamed freely on the Museum’s grounds, substantially affected interstate commerce where the Museum invited and received thousands of admission paying visitors from beyond Florida, many of whom were drawn by the Museum’s reputation for and purposeful marketing of the Hemingway cats and where the exhibition of the Hemingway cats was integral to the Museum’s commercial purpose. Therefore, Congress had the power to regulate the Museum and the exhibition of the Hemingway cats via the AWA.
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