Articles Posted in 2013

Abdouch v. Lopez, Nebraska Supreme Court (4/19/13)
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Injury Law

Plaintiff was a resident of Nebraska. In 1963, Plaintiff received a copy of the book “Revolutionary Road,” which was inscribed to her by the late author Richard Yates. Plaintiff’s inscribed copy of the book was later stolen. Ken Lopez and his company, Ken Lopez Bookseller (KLB), bought the book in 2009 from a seller in Georgia and sold it to a customer not in Nebraska. Plaintiff later learned that Lopez had used the inscription in the book for advertising purposes on his website. Plaintiff brought suit against Lopez and KLB for violating her right to privacy. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint failed to plead facts to demonstrate that Lopez and KLB had sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Nebraska, as (1) the contacts created by the website were unrelated to Plaintiff’s cause of action, and (2) under the Calder v. Jones foreseeable effects test, the pleadings failed to establish that Lopez and KLB expressly aimed their tortious conduct at the state of Nebraska.

Read More:  ‘Revolutionary Road’ ruling seen as victory for Internet businesses

Missouri v McNeely, United States Supreme Court (4/17/13)
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

McNeely, stopped for speeding and crossing the centerline, declined to take a breath test to measure his blood alcohol concentration (BAC). He was arrested and taken to a hospital. The officer never attempted to secure a search warrant. McNeely refused to consent, but the officer directed a lab technician to take a sample. McNeely’s BAC tested above the legal limit, and he was charged with driving while intoxicated. The trial court suppressed the test result, concluding that the exigency exception to the warrant requirement did not apply because, apart from the fact that McNeely’s blood alcohol was dissipating, no circumstances suggested that the officer faced an emergency. The Missouri Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. The Court looked to the “totality of circumstances,” declining to announce a per se rule. When officers in drunk-driving investigations can reasonably obtain a warrant before having a blood sample drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so. Circumstances may make obtaining a warrant impractical such that dissipation will support an exigency, but that is a reason to decide each case on its facts. Blood testing is different in critical respects from other destruction-of-evidence cases; BAC evidence naturally dissipates in a gradual and relatively predictable manner. Because an officer must typically obtain a trained medical professional’s assistance before having a blood test conducted, some delay between the time of the arrest and time of the test is inevitable regardless of whether a warrant is obtained.

Read More: Supreme Court Backs Warrants For Blood Tests In DUI Cases

Rios-Pineiro v. United States, US 1st Cir. (4/15/13)
Contracts, Government & Administration Law, Injury Law, Labor & Employment Law

The United States Postal Services (USPS) terminated Plaintiff’s employment contract after discovering, through a sting operation, that Plaintiff had stolen mail containing money. The Postal Service Board of Contract Appeals (PSBCA) convened an evidentiary hearing and determined that Plaintiff’s breach of his employment contract justified the decision to terminate his contract. Plaintiff did not appeal this decision. Meanwhile, Plaintiff initiated a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) suit against the United States for the actions of USPS employees on the date of the sting, alleging six torts. The district court dismissed three of the claims and granted summary judgment to the government on the remaining claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court as to all claims, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that the PSCBA’s findings precluded re-litigation of the factual issues in Plaintiff’s FTCA suit; and (2) summary judgment was properly granted as to Plaintiff’s FTCA claims for negligent supervision, malicious prosecution, and invasion of privacy by postal inspectors.

United States v. Scruggs, US 5th Cir. (4/12/13)
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Defendant, an attorney and the brother-in-law of Trent Lott, appealed from the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion challenging one of his two convictions for bribing a judge. Defendant’s conviction stemmed from his bribe of a circuit court judge in a lawsuit involving a fee-sharing dispute with co-counsel (the “Wilson Case”). Defendant offered to recommend the judge to Lott, who at the time was a U.S. Senator, for a district court judgeship in exchange for the judge’s help in winning the Wilson Case. The court concluded that Skilling v. United States, which addressed the constitutionality of the honest-services statute, 18 U.S.C. 1346, had no effect on the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction over defendant’s guilty plea. Defendant had shown neither his actual innocence of post-Skilling honest-services fraud nor that there was cause and prejudice for failing to raise a constitutional-vagueness challenge to section 1346. Therefore, defendant procedurally defaulted on his claim and the district court correctly denied his section 2255 motion. Finally, the court rejected defendant’s First Amendment overbreadth challenge to section 1346. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Read More: Ex-lawyer Dickie Scruggs asks to return to prison after losing key appeal

McCarthy v. Fuller, US 7th Cir (4/10/13)
Constitutional Law, Contracts, Non-Profit Organizations

In 1956, Sister Ephrem of the Most Precious Blood, experienced apparitions of the Virgin Mary, during which, Sister Ephrem claimed, she was told: “I am Our Lady of America.” The Archbishop supported a program of devotions to Our Lady of America. In 1965 Pope Paul VI approved creation of a cloister, which lasted until at least 1977, when surviving members left and formed a new congregation, dedicated to devotions to Our Lady of America.  Sister Ephrem directed it until her death in 2000. Sister Therese succeeded Sister Ephrem, who willed to Sister Theres all her property, mostly purchased with donated money. Sister Therese worked with McCarthy, a lawyer, and Langsenkamp until 2007, when Langsenkamp and McCarthy established the Langsenkamp Family Apostolate in the chapel in which the Virgin Mary allegedly appeared to Sister Ephrem. They sued Sister Therese, claiming theft of physical and intellectual property, fraud, and defamation. She counterclaimed alleging theft of a statue and of the website and defamation by calling her a “fake nun.”  The district court denied McCarthy’s motion that the court take notice of the Holy See’s rulings on Sister Therese’s status in the Church. The Seventh Circuit reversed, with “a reminder” that courts may not decide (or to allow juries to decide) religious questions.  Determination of the ownership of the property is likely possible without resolving religious questions.

United States v. Grigsby, US 6th Cir. (4/11/13)
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Grigsby, a middle-age man who lived in homeless shelters, was charged with three unarmed bank robberies, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Psychologists conducted examinations and filed reports that diagnosed paranoid schizophrenia and stated that Grigsby was not competent to stand trial. Neither party objected. The court committed Grigsby to custody (18 U.S.C. 4241(d)(1))  to determine whether he could be restored to competency to stand trial. Forensic evaluators concluded that Grigsby did not understand the seriousness of his legal difficulty; lacked ability to assist his lawyer during trial; and was not capable of waiving his constitutional rights rationally or of testifying on his own behalf. Grigsby refused to take oral medication. Because he was not gravely disabled and did not present a danger to himself, others, or the facility, he did not meet the criteria for involuntary medication. The evaluators requested an order authorizing them to inject Grigsby involuntarily with a first-generation antipsychotic drug, (haloperidol (Haldol) or fluphenazine), or a second-generation antipsychotic drug, risperidone, to restore competency. These medications can cause serious side effects. The district court granted an order under Sell v. U.S. (2003). The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that special circumstances unique to the case indicate that Grigsby’s liberty interest in avoiding involuntary medication outweighs the government’s interest in prosecution.

Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., US 7th Cir. (4/10/13)
Bankruptcy, Education Law

Krieger, age 53, cannot pay her debts. She lives with her mother in a rural community; they have only monthly income from governmental programs. She is too poor to move and her car, more than 10 years old, needs repairs. She lacks Internet access.  In her bankruptcy proceeding, Educational Credit moved to exempt her student loans from discharge; 11 U.S.C.523(a)(8) excludes educational loans “unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor.”  The district court reversed the bankruptcy court, noting that Krieger, although unable to pay even $1 per year, had not enrolled in a program that offered a 25-year payment schedule. The Seventh Circuit reversed, in favor of Krieger. “Undue hardship” requires showing that the debtor cannot maintain a minimal standard of living if forced to repay; that additional circumstances exist indicating that this situation is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period; and that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay. The court noted that Krieger incurred the debt to obtain paralegal training at a community college, has made about 200 applications in 10 years, and used a substantial part of her divorce settlement to pay off as much of the educational loan as possible.

Florida v. Jardines, United States Supreme Court (3/26/13)
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Police took a drug-sniffing dog to Jardines’ front porch, where the dog gave a positive alert for narcotics. The officers then obtained a warrant for a search, which revealed marijuana plants. Jardines was charged with trafficking in cannabis. The Supreme Court of Florida approved the trial court’s suppression of the evidence.  The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. The investigation of Jardines’ home was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. When the Government obtains information by physically intruding on persons, houses, papers, or effects, a search within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment has “undoubtedly occurred.” The right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion is the “very core” of the Fourth Amendment.  The area immediately surrounding and associated with the home, the curtilage, is part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. The front porch is the classic exemplar of an area to which the activity of home life extends.  The officers’ entry was not explicitly or implicitly invited. Officers need not “shield their eyes” when passing a home on public thoroughfares but “no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave.”  A police officer without a warrant may approach a home in hopes of speaking to occupants, because that is “no more than any private citizen might do” but the scope of a license is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose, and there is no customary invitation to enter the curtilage simply to conduct a search.

Read More: Drug-Sniffing Dog Case Fails Supreme Court’s Smell Test

Johnson v. Priceline.com, Inc., US 2nd Cir. (3/27/13)
Consumer Law, Contracts

Plaintiffs initiated this putative class action against Priceline, seeking compensatory, punitive, and equitable relief for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and contract, as well as a violation of Connecticut’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-110b. Plaintiffs’ claims arose from Priceline’s alleged failure to disclose to users of its “Name Your Own Price” booking service that a successful bid for a hotel room would generally exceed the amount Priceline itself compensated the hotel vendor, with Priceline retaining the difference as profit. Because plaintiffs failed as a matter of law to allege an agency relationship between Priceline and consumers who use its “Name Your Own Price” service to reserve hotel accommodations, they could not plausibly claim that Priceline breached an agent’s fiduciary duty in failing to apprise consumers that it might have procured the accommodations at costs lower than their bids, retaining the difference as profits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims.

Read More: Priceline doesn’t have to tell customers it pockets profits, appeals court rules

In re Bulger, US 1st Cir. (3/14/13)
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics

James “Whitey” Bulger was the leader of a criminal organization in Boston from 1972 to 1999. An indictment returned by a federal grand jury charged Bulger with a number of federal offenses, including violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, and the indictment alleged that Bulger committed nineteen murders ancillary to the RICO conspiracy. Bulger’s case was assigned to U.S. District Court Judge Richard Stearns. Bulger moved that Judge Stearns recuse himself, arguing that the judge’s prior employment as head of the U.S. Attorney’s Criminal Division in Boston and his close friendship with FBI Director Robert Mueller created an appearance of impropriety necessitating recusal. Judge Stearns denied the motion. Bulger subsequently petitioned the First Circuit Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus requiring reversal of the judge’s order denying the motion for recusal. In an opinion written by Hon. David H. Souter, the First Circuit granted the petition and ordered the case to be reassigned to a different judge “because it is clear that a reasonable person would question the capacity for impartiality of any judicial officer with the judge’s particular background in the federal prosecutorial apparatus in Boston during the period covered by the accusations.”

St. Patrick’s Day is a day when we celebrate the Irish in all (or at least 35 million) of us. We honor our Irish ancestors, relatives and friends by dressing in green, visiting an Irish pub, or participating in a festive parade.

Food manufacturers also observe St. Patrick’s Day through the creative use of food coloring, which is regulated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Pigments used to color food and derived from vegetables, minerals or animals are exempt from certification. A natural source of green food coloring would be grape skin extract.

California Assemblyman Brian Nestande (R-42nd Dist.) has put forth a bill to apply a Creative Commons License to the California Code of Regulations (CCR). According to Mr. Nestande’s site, “AB 292 will provide that the full text of the California Code of Regulations shall have an open access creative commons attribution license, allowing any individual, at no cost, to use, distribute and create derivative works based on the material for either commercial or noncommercial purposes.”

Right now, the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) owns and publishes the CCR. The OAL was created by Cal. Gov’t Code §11340. Cal. Gov. Code §11343 et seq governs the filing and publication of the Cal. Code Regs. The Office of Administrative law collects the regulations from issuing agencies, and after notice, sends them to the Secretary of State for certification. The OAL is then charged with providing for the “or the official compilation, printing, and publication of adoption, amendment, or repeal of regulations, which shall be known as the California Code of Regulations.” (Cal. Gov’t Code §11344(a)).

Section 11344.4(a) also allows them to sell the CCR: “The California Code of Regulations, the California Code of Regulations Supplement, and the California Regulatory Notice Register shall be sold at prices which will reimburse the state for all costs incurred for printing, publication, and distribution.”

The OAL currently contracts with Thompson West/Barclay’s to publish the official version of the CCR. According to Mr. Nestande’s office, the OAL licenses the CCR to West for $400,000 per year, plus 7% of all royalties. [The office did not have a copy of the latest contract, but you can see the contract for 2009-2012 here]. We don’t how much it would cost to produce the CCR in house, but it’s not a stretch to imagine that the OAL is turning a profit on this deal – which seems to be outside the scope of its charter in 11344.4. Mr. Nestande’s office points out that this creates a conflict of interest for the OAL – “As more businesses are covered by new regulations, more businesses need to purchase access to those regulations from Thomson, and OAL derives a larger profit.  This makes it difficult to be truly objective when approving new regulations, if it directly benefits from expanding the state’s regulatory burden.”

I think the bigger conflict of interest is that Cal Gov’t Code §11344(a) requires the OAL to post the CCR’s online for free, but their incentive for profit is interfering with the public’s ability to view and use those regulations. The CCR is hosted online by Westlaw. They are papered over with disclaimers (“The Official California Code of Regulations is available in looseleaf printed format from Thomson – West / Barclays (1-800-888-3600)) and copyright statements (© 2013 Office of Administrative Law for the State of California;” “Use of all or part of the data displayed on this site for commercial or other unauthorized purposes is prohibited.”). The regs on the site are not indexed by Google, and users cannot download or copy them without violating the copyright. What’s more, they’re not official. The Bluebook requires you to cite to the official version, which is the Westlaw Compilation.

There’s another absurdity in the status quo: Westlaw actually sells copies of its Compilated Regs to other state offices. You know, state regulatory offices that devised the regs to begin with. According to the Assemblyman’s office, “Nearly all state agencies and departments purchase the compilation from West, in addition to hundreds of trade associations, and individual business owners that purchase single section subscriptions.”

Last week, Public.Resource.Org, through their counsel at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, filed an action for declaratory judgement against the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors’ National Association, Inc. [SMACNA]. In its complaint, Public.Resource.org asserts that since SMACNA’s copyrighted standards were explicitly incorporated into federal and state law, they have become part of the public domain and are no longer subject to copyright restrictions.

This saga began when Carl Malamud of Public.Resource.Org began buying copies of privately issued, copyrighted building codes and putting them up online. These codes were incorporated by law into federal and state statutes, so Carl believed that they should be publicly available – a  proposition we agreed with.

When Attributor, an agent for SMACNA, discovered the codes on Public.Resource.Org, they sent a DMCA takedown notice. Public.Resource.Org now seeks a declaratory judgment from the federal courts that it is not infringing. It asserts that since these standards were incorporated by reference into federal law, the manual is now “the law of the United States and compliance with the 1985 manual is mandatory,” and thus is part of federal law – which is not subject to copyright.

We start off our picks this week with a dog sniff case from the Supreme Court.  A side note that several opinions came down from the High Court this week – to check them all out go to Justia’s Supreme Court Center , or sign up for our USSC Summary Newsletter.

Florida v. Harris, US Supreme Court (2/19/13)
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Officer Wheetley pulled Harris over for a routine traffic stop. Wheetley sought consent to search Harris’s truck, based on Harris’s nervousness and seeing an open beer can. When Harris refused, Wheetley executed a sniff test with his trained narcotics dog, Aldo, who alerted at the driver’s-side door, leading Wheetley to conclude that he had probable cause to search. The search turned up nothing Aldo was trained to detect, but did reveal ingredients for manufacturing methamphetamine. Harris was charged with illegal possession of those ingredients. In a subsequent stop while Harris was out on bail, Aldo again alerted on Harris’s truck but nothing of interest was found. The trial court denied a motion to suppress. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that if an officer failed to keep records of field performance, including how many times a dog falsely alerted, he could never have probable cause to think the dog a reliable indicator of drugs. The Supreme Court reversed. Training and testing records supported Aldo’s reliability in detecting drugs and Harris failed to undermine that evidence, so Wheetley had probable cause to search. Whether an officer has probable cause depends on the totality of the circumstances, not rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries. Requiring the state to introduce comprehensive documentation of a dog’s prior hits and misses in the field is the antithesis of a totality-of-the-circumstances approach. Field records may sometimes be relevant, but the court should evaluate all the evidence, and should not prescribe an inflexible set of requirements.

Read More:
Supreme Court Sides with Drug Sniffing Dog

And for Fun – Check out Jake the German Shepherd. The newest member of Justia’s Dog Pack! 🙂

Caldwell v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., New York Court of Appeals (2/7/13)

After falling on the street and injuring her leg, Plaintiff commenced this negligence action against Communications Specialists, Inc. (CSI) for creating a hazardous condition in the road by failing to properly pave over a trench CSI cut to install high-speed fiber-optic cable underneath the street. To rebut Plaintiff’s testimony that a dip in the trench caused her to fall, CSI subpoenaed a physician who treated Plaintiff shortly after the accident and declared that Plaintiff “tripped over a dog.” CSI paid the doctor $10,000 for appearing at trial. Plaintiff’s counsel asked the court to charge the jury that, pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8001, the doctor was entitled to a witness fee of $15 per day. The court gave the jury a general bias charge but made no specific reference to the payment the doctor received for appearing at trial. The jury found that CSI was negligent but that such negligence was not a substantial factor in bringing about the accident. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court should have issued a bias charge specifically tailored to address the payment CSI made to the doctor; but (2) the court’s failure to issue such an instruction in this case was harmless.

Read More: Jurors Must Be Told of Well-Paid Witnesses